important sense, private law is corrective justice. The important question to ask, they believe, is how well our positive legal doctrines match the normative content of (corrective) justice. Theorists of this ilk are not committed to denying that Private law relates causally to others aspects of justice (say, distributive justice), but many would not think that much would be learned about private law (or its constitutive parts) should those causal relations be fully revealed. So, if in the title's question we qualify justice as "corrective", the question could at best convey a plea for an explanation of how our positive private laws achieve (or fall short of) the task of replicating the normative standards of justice. If in the title's question we qualify justice as "distributive", the question might be an interesting social theory question to ask, but would reveal very little about private law.
In this article, I resist the temptation to dismiss the question for either of those reasons and try to demonstrate that a more focused look at certain traditional private law doctrines and concepts, combined with a closer look at theories of justice, would yield illuminating answers to the question of private law's usefulness to justice. My focus will be in positive private law doctrines and rules concerning allocation of goods and my claim is that the instrumental value they possess vis-à-vis justice can be constitutive, not merely causal, in nature. If that claim were borne by the arguments below, the title's answer would yield a suitably informative (and general) answer.
Let me start with by posing the simple claim that the positive allocation of particular goods to particular people by means of either legal rules or particular legal decisions is instrumental to the realization of a distributively just state of affairs. If we assume that achieving a distributively just state of affairs 1 is valuable, whatever helps bring it about can be safely thought to be instrumentally valuable in relation to that particular end. So such legal rules and decisions are valuable for the sake of something other than themselves: they are a means to achieving a distributively just allocation of goods within a particular social group.
The apparent simplicity of the claim above hides a more complex conceptual and normative hinterland. There is more than one way in which value can be conveyed from something that possesses final value to the means which are conductive to realizing such value. In relation to the particular objects that concern me here, I argue that there are two different ways in which legal rules and decisions might be instrumental in relation to achieving a distributively just state of affairs.
2 Yet, one of the ways in which allocative rules and decisions can be instrumentally valuable remains opaque to the current literature on the matter of how value supervenes on private law and its constituent norms, concepts and doctrines.
The question of how value supervenes on private law institutions (including rules about allocations of goods) has invited apparently opposing general answers. While the dominant view on the matter of private law's value is that it possesses value of an instrumental kind, 3 some, most notably Ernest Weinrib, have defended the thesis that private law (conceived as a system of liability) should not be conceived as if it had a purpose extrinsic to it. As Weinrib famously put it "…[t]he purpose of private law is simply to be private law". 4 This opposition between private law's 'instrumental' and 'final' 5 value needs further clarification, as the two ways of being valuable are not 2 As we will see in section C below, this claim needs to be qualified, as it only applies to a particular type of distributive criteria, which I term allocation-unbound. 3 Leslie Green makes the point that virtually every contemporary general conception law's value agrees that law possesses instrumental value, in L Green, "Law as a Means", in P Cane (ed), The Hart-Fuller Debate in the 21 st Century (2010) 169 at 170-171. Specifically in relation to private law, instrumentalism is a central feature of 'Law and Economics' approaches to private law, but it is hardly exclusive to it. The belief that "The norms of private law are purely instrumental, in at least two aspects one pertaining to value, the other to content" (B Zipursky, "Philosophy of Private Law", in J Coleman and S Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (2002) 623 at 625) is shared with many other approaches to private law. For an overview of private law instrumentalism see J Pojanowsky, "Private law in the gaps" (2014) 82 FordhamLR 1705-1712). Neither is this approach new or restricted to the Anglo-American legal tradition. To name but two classical texts in that vein, Otto von Gierke, inspired by Jhering's work, gave the public lecture later published as Die Soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts (1889); 30 years later, K Renner publishes his classical The Institutions of Private Law and their Social Function (1929, English translation, 1949) . 4 E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (1995) 21. 5 Throughout this article I will be using the "instrumentally valuable" and "valuable in itself"(or "finally valuable") to designate, respectively, the quality of being valuable for the sake of something else and the quality of being valuable for its own sake. I will avoid using the expressions "extrinsic" and "intrinsic", as they are ambiguous mutually exclusive. Something might possess both final value and instrumental value if it also furthers the realization of another value. In fact, both kinds of value might supervene on the same property possessed by the object. The property of "having being used by Abraham Lincoln to sign the Emancipation Proclamation" makes the gold pen held by the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library valuable in itself (i.e. it possesses final value); and under some conditions, the same property might lend the same gold pen instrumental value, as when it is used as a means to educate children about justice and equality.
Therefore, "valuable in itself" conceptions of the value of private law would pay a high price on plausibility if their proponents were to argue that no instrumental value can ever supervene on particular private law institutions. Whatever "final" value private law (or an aspect thereof) might have, if it also helps to, say, maximize utility (perhaps by preventing harm) or to bring about a state of affairs that is distributively just, it would also have instrumental value as a means to achieving a valuable end.
So the claim that the purpose of private law is to be private law is not best understood as a substantive claim about there being only one kind of value served by private law and its constituent parts, but rather as a claim about a distinctive feature private law (conceived as a system of liability) possesses: it possesses value in itself.
Understood in that way, the claim is simply that, whatever else is part of the core concept of private law, one of its distinctive features is that its value is noninstrumental. 6 Private law (qua private law) would not be a means to achieve certain state of affairs deemed to be valuable (although it could certainly do so), but instead would be the unpacking of a certain value that such theorists often identify as the value of corrective justice. So, they conclude, private law's value (qua private law), unlike the value of instruments, is not contingent on the inexistence of better means to achieve the relevant final values.
between this meaning and the alternative meaning of "having value that supervenes on a relational property" and "having meaning that supervenes on a non-relational property, as remarked by C Korsgaard in "Two distinctions in goodness" (1983) 92 Philosophical Review, 169-195. 6 On how this approach could explain private law's distinctiveness see, for instance, E Weinrib, Corrective Justice (2012) at 10-11; 13; and 28. 
B. WHAT IS AN ALLOCATION?
An "allocation" is a pairing between a particular good and a particular person. It establishes a relationship between the allocatee and the particular good that does not hold between anyone else and that good. The allocative relationship between a particular good and a particular person has been explained in terms of control: a good is allocated to a person if the good is subject to the allocatee's control (or, sometimes, to her 'will'.) 8 However, the notion of 'subjection to control' is not itself transparent and the need for precision is clear if we bear in mind how little effective control people have over the fate of goods allocated to them. The notion of 'control'
overstates the position of an allocatee, whose allocation is subject to vicissitudes that are often entirely beyond her control. a given action (as "due", "permitted", etc) and not directly to a given good. To state that the allocation pairs a person to a good is just shorthand for saying that the allocatee (i) has a number of liberties to act in certain ways towards a particular good (say sitting on it or carrying it around); and, (ii) has a number of claim-rights that others do (or abstain from doing) certain things in relation to the good (e.g. destroying it). Hence, at the ground floor, the normative relationship between the person and the good is a bundle of normative positions connecting persons (including, but not limited to, the allocatee) to "actions" which are allowed, prescribed or forbidden vis-à-vis certain goods.
What brings those positions together is the fact that, taken as a bundle, they create a normative space within which the allocatee is entitled exercise control over the particular good. Writing specifically about the kind of allocation that takes the form of private property, Larissa Katz has defended the idea that the owner has an 'agendasetting' normative power in relation to the object of the property right. In Hohfeldian terms, the allocatee has a liberty to set the agenda for the good (that is to say, the allocatee does not have a duty not to set the agenda for the particular good). That liberty is exclusive, in the sense that everyone else is under just such duty to not act so as to make their decisions prevail over the allocatee's decisions on that particular matter (and the allocatee has the corresponding claim-right).
The allocatee's position also includes a power, as each agenda-setting decision by the allocatee changes the normative landscape of others (their liberties and powers to decide about the good might be restricted and/or expanded by the allocatee's agendasetting decisions). The existence of these Hohfeldian positions constitutes an area of exclusivity for the allocatee 13 in the sense of creating for them (and only for them) a protected agenda-setting position. 14 Exclusivity, in this sense, is the touchstone of allocations.
It is important to remark at this stage that the allocation of particular goods to particular people is contingent on the occurrence of particular events, regardless of whether such allocation is thought of as a moral normative position or as a legal normative position. A moral theorist such as Nozick or, more controversially, Locke, 15 would have the moral allocation be contingent on facts such as the mixing of the allocatee's labour with a particular object or the occurrence of a particular transaction between the allocatee and whoever had the power to transfer the allocated good.
A legal allocation, on the other hand, depends on the contingent fact of a positive allocation. By "positive" here I simply mean that the allocation was normative positions I have against a bank in relation to monetary value sitting in my current account. 13 But not in the "boundary" sense defended by some private property theorists, as the right to exclude others (which correlates to the duty others have not to interfere with the allocation), and which finds a paradigmatic instance in J Penner, There are many advantages in having the law allocate goods to you. In modern legal democracies, it often means that the state (and its power) will back your decisions about the allocated good by words and deeds. Even in the absence of stateforce backing to private rights it is not difficult to imagine the advantages of being allocated a good. 16 Moreover, awarding such legal advantages to private individuals might be objectively valuable as a means to generate states of affairs that could be conceivably achieved by other means (say, achieving environmental equilibrium, or the better preservation of existing social goods). That sort of instrumental value is not, however, the one that concerns me here. What matters here is the ways in which positive rules of allocation might be instrumental to achieving a state of affairs that is distributively just. In order to see the different ways in which positive allocations can be instrumentally valuable to that end, we need clarity about the kinds of distributive criteria that can be used to justify particular allocation schemes.
C. JUSTIFYING ALLOCATIONS
16 In fact, for most of Roman history the state had only an indirect role in the execution of judgments, as it just "authorized the successful plaintiff to pressurize the defendant into complying with the judgment -a form of regulated self-help, the onus being firmly on the plaintiff to obtain satisfaction." See P Regardless of how they are articulated, the chief criteria within each conception of justice fall within two broad kinds. Criteria of the first kind are "bound"
to one particular allocation scheme, which means that they are only able to justify one set of particular pairings between persons and goods. Criteria of the second kind, on the other hand, might be able to justify a number of different particular sets of pairings between persons and goods, provided each such set of pairings meets certain requirements. I will be referring to justificatory criteria belonging to the first kind as "bound" and to justificatory criteria belonging to the second kind as "unbound". In the remainder of this section I intend to refine and explicate the distinction between the two kinds of criteria.
A paradigmatic example of a bound criterion to justify allocations is Nozick's What results is a criterion to justify allocations that is, in his words, historical:
"whether a distribution is just depends upon how it came about". 29 What that means is that, if one knows (a) the criteria that justify acquisition and transfer and, (b) the relevant facts (on the one hand, who mixed labour with what and, on the other, the "ledger" of justified transfers), one should be able to determine what precisely should belong to whom. Nothing else is needed. In particular, there is no need for additional criteria to be drawn from either further moral reasons or positive acts of allocation in order to identify the particular pairings between each person and each good.
The same cannot be said about allocation-unbound justificatory criteria to the allocation of goods. Such criteria do not identify the particular goods to be allocated and the particular persons that are going to receive each good. These justificatory criteria might be satisfied by many different (and mutually incompatible) allocative arrangements as they only specify that goods belonging to a certain class or possessing a certain property are to be allocated to people belonging to a certain class or possessing a certain property.
Theories of distributive justice that put forward allocation-unbound criteria are legion but, partly for that reason, the best way to explain how they can be all One kind of criterion that I might plausibly adopt to decide on the appropriateness of the allocations is that each of the children can have one toy from a particular class, say a puzzle. If that criterion is all I have to go about pairing each child with a toy, I have no criteria that would allow me to determine which specific puzzle should be allocated to which particular child. Even if there are only two identical puzzles in the shop, in the absence of further criteria there is no way to decide which child should have which of the identical puzzles. All the criterion gives us is the characterization of a class of goods (puzzles) and of children (my children), but the set of characteristics identified are unhelpful in matching a puzzle to a child.
Call these "class-based" distributive criteria.
Another kind of allocation-unbound criterion I might use (one that is very popular in contemporary theories of justice) places the justificatory criteria one step further removed from the actual goods to be allocated. In allocating toys among my children during our visit to the toyshop I might establish that a toy-child pairing would be justified only if each toy given to each child has the same value (perhaps qualified by the prudential proviso that they should be worth less than £10). This sort of strategy is predicated (i) on the identification of a scalar property common to the relevant objects (say, their "market value") and, (ii) on a comparison of the relevant items regarding where they sit on the relevant scale (e.g. the market value of item X might be £5 and the market value of item Y might be £9), thus yielding a result (in our example, the conclusion that that assigning X to one child and Y to the other is not justified). Call these "property-based" criteria.
Property-based criteria present the same insufficiency we saw above in relation to the class-based criteria: assuming that there is more than one object or combination of objects that sits at the precise point of the scale that would make the allocation justified, it would be impossible to determine which specific object should be allocated to which particular person. In our example even if there are only two toys that possess the same market value (say a puzzle worth £9 and a board game also worth £9), the criterion would not be sufficient to determine which child should have which toy.
Thus, the many theories of distributive justice that put forward property-based criteria for apportioning wealth are predicated on allocation-unbound, criteria. Such criteria are neutral regarding which good should be allocated to which individual and, as a result, there are many conceivable particular allocative arrangements that would be justified by the same criteria. If the criteria of allocation between my children is either class-based or property-based, there are different particular toys whose allocation to the children would satisfy the criteria, but which would be mutually exclusive.
In the past few paragraphs I have qualified allocation-unbound criteria for evaluating distributions as "somehow incomplete" and as "unhelpful". This language might give the impression that distributive justice theories that give pride of place to such criteria are themselves incomplete or unhelpful so that either they need to be changed in such a way that they specify how precisely goods should be allocated or else they need to be abandoned in favour of allocation-bound theories of distributive justice. It is important to clarify that that is not what results from the analysis above.
All that follows from this incompleteness is that when using allocation-unbound criteria to justify the pairing between a particular person and a particular object, a necessity arises that does not arise with regard to allocation-bound criteria. 30 Puzzles, as well as shares in wealth and purchase power, cannot be allocated in the abstract.
Shares in both wealth (and other such properties of goods) and in good-types only 30 That feature of allocation-unbound theories does however create a pro tanto reason to favour allocation-bound theories grounded on the value of parsimony or simplicity in philosophical theories. As Aristotle put it: "Let that demonstration be better which, other things being equal, depends on fewer postulates or suppositions or propositions." (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 86a34-35). Needless to say, my argument is that this pro tanto reason is easily outweighed by considerations in favour of allocation-unbound criteria. 
D -HOW TO PAIR PARTICULAR PEOPLE TO PARTICULAR GOODS
The story used in the previous section in order to introduce allocation-unbound distributive justice criteria might lead one to believe that pairing is an easy enough affair. After all, I might quickly decide which of the identical puzzles goes to each child (in my first example) or perhaps I can outsource the decision to the children themselves. Whatever toy they happen choose within the parameters I gave them would give me a reason to bring the particular allocation about. That strategy, in turn, seem to be grounded on sound arguments about respecting my children's autonomy and on the pedagogy of freedom (i.e. that one learns to be free by acting freely). But however easy these solutions might be to envisage and justify, they are still predicated on the need for a positive decision (mine or my children's) in order to bring about the pairing.
But perhaps I do not need such positive decisions. Perhaps moral reasons other than those embodied in the justificatory criteria (or even prudential reasons), can be sufficient to establish which particular pairings are justified. In the toyshop scenario, I
might pair each child with the particular good they grabbed first and that might be justified in terms of expediency, cost-efficiency, fairness or a combination of these and other normative considerations. And if this still seems to be dependent on a certain decision (by the children about taking possession of particular toys), there are certainly other such considerations that would not be so. The fact that one child loves a particular and unique puzzle above all other toys (of the same kind, or, in propertybased criteria, within the relevant price range) is a reason to allocate that particular puzzle to her even if the allocation of another toy (say another puzzle or a magic set)
would also fall within the relevant allocation-unbound criteria.
It is not clear, however, whether such reasons would suffice to accomplish the pairing job in most situations, in particular when property-based criteria are to be used at a large scale. It seems even less likely that this will apply to all goods and to all people and, in any case, the transaction costs of making such a determination might be prohibitive, so that there would be both moral and prudential reasons compelling us to find another way to discharge the pairing job.
Thankfully, moral reasons are not the only resource available to us for pairing particular goods to particular people. Positive law is able to do just the same. In fact, that is a crucial difference between the value of positive law with regard to, on the one hand, allocation-bound criteria and, on the other, allocation-unbound criteria for the justification of allocations. Before we move on to the question of the value of positive law in relation to distributive justice, let me further specify the claim that positive law is able to discharge the pairing job.
As we saw above, most legal systems include general rules specifying the conditions under which a certain good is to be paired with a certain person. Whenever we judge that a thing is "good as a means," we are making a judgment with regard to its causal relations: we judge both that it will have a particular kind of effect, and that that effect will be good in itself. In relation to conceptions of distributive justice that are predicated on allocation-unbound justificatory criteria, however, they perform an additional role and, accordingly, are instrumentally valuable in a different way. As we saw above, such justificatory criteria, in both its variations (class-based and property-based) are unable to perform the pairing of particular goods to particular people. In relation to them, positive allocations' rules and decisions perform another role: they allocate.
E. THE VALUES OF PRIVATE LAW INSTITUTIONS
They produce the allocations (the pairings between particular persons and particular goods) without which the justificatory criteria could not be satisfied. They constitute the allocative relationships that allocation-unbound criteria evaluate. Their value supervenes on a property they possess which is not the same property that might make them causally instrumentally valuable, namely, their ability to allocate. Positive law 38 This is a point made by some theorists of justice in relation to the connection between distributive and corrective justice (by which they often mean precisely the basic structure of tort law and, sometimes, of unjustified enrichment law). The latter is vindicated by its ability to help realize the former. See, for instance, J Gordley, "The moral foundations of private law" (2002) constitutes the object whose value is assessed by the non-self-applying allocationunbound criteria of distributive justice.
As we saw above, this ability to produce the pairings is instrumental to sorting the problems generated by the inherent underdeterminacy of allocation-unbound justificatory criteria and, in doing so, they allow for distributive justice to generate pro tanto reasons for action, thus fulfilling what can be safely considered to be one of the desiderata of any theory of distributive justice. This sort of instrumental value is not merely causal (although it might also be so), in the sense that the value of the particular state of affairs that it contributes to is at least in part explained by the legal rules of allocation. An alternative explanation to that way to be valuable might see it not so much as an instrumental value, but rather the kind of extrinsic value that a part might have in relation to the whole. 39 If you take the whole to be the complete set of criteria that determine all the allocations that are distributively just in a given social group, the legal rules we have been discussing in this article would constitute part of the set of criteria.
In both analyses (non-causal instrumental value or extrinsic value as a part) the way in which such rules are valuable in relation to distributive justice is not the same way in which they might be valuable as a result of causing a distributively just state of affairs to come into existence.
So there we have it: one kind of positive private rule (legal rules of allocation), one object with final value (the realization of distributive justice in the allocation of goods), two kinds of instrumental value (the "instrumental-causal" and the "instrumental-constitutive"), grounded in two separate properties possessed by those rules (the ability to causally contribute to the protection of just allocative pairings and the ability to allocate). So the answer to the question I posed as the title of this article is more subtle and nuanced than it might have first appeared. A set of traditional positive rules of private law do something of immense value for distributive justice:
39 The literature on value has identified different kinds of "extrinsic" value, amongst which are the instrumental value, the symbolic value, and the value something might have as part of a whole. See B Bradley (n34) at 110 and B Bradley, "Instrumental Value", in H LaFollette, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2013) 2638-2640 at 2638.
